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SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V.OREGON: THE GLASS IS HALF FULL
by
JanetKoven Levit °
Although the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon limited the remedies available under the Vienna Convention, all
is not lost. First,by avoiding the question of the judicial enforceability of
the treaty, the Court fundamentally preserved a role for courts in
vindicating Vienna Convention transgressions. State courts, often the
foreign national'sinitial touch point with the criminaljustice system, will
thus remain a significant venue for Vienna Convention claims. However,
internationallegal scholars and practitionersoften neglect the role of
state courts in the making and enforcing of internationallaw. Thus, the
international legal community should focus additional attention on
educating state court judges, as well as preparing practitioners to
address such internationalissues that will inevitably arise in state court.
Second, while the Sanchez-Llamas Court eliminated some criminal
remedies, it did not curtail civil remedies that might be availablefor
foreign nationals who have not been afforded Vienna Convention
protections. Third, diffuse transnational legal processes, involving a
multitude of judicial and non-judicial actors, have helped entrench
Vienna Convention rights over the past decade; in maintaininga role for
the judiciary and thus preserving the underlying institutionalstatus quo,
the Courtdid little to stymie or disruptthese constitutive processes.
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INTRODUCTION

On the day the Court decided Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, my Dean sent
me condolences: "I know there was a tug on your heart earlier this week when
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled adversely on the Vienna Convention issues that
you care about so much."' My reply was, in my Dean's view, surprisingly
. Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; Yale Law School (J.D., 1994);
Yale University (M.A., 1994); Princeton University (A.B., 1990). I would like to thank Chris
Blair and John Parry for their invaluable insights on this Essay.
1 E-mail from Dean Robert Butkin to Janet Koven Levit, Associate Professor,
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sanguine.
Certainly, on one level, the Court's decision was a defeat for Vienna
Convention advocates, for it circumscribed viable remedies in the face of
Vienna Convention transgressions. 2 Indeed, the Court concluded that the
Vienna Convention does not demand suppression of incriminating statements
in the wake of Article 36 violations and that the exclusionary rule is an3
appropriate remedy only when domestic law favors its application.
Furthermore, the Court decided that Vienna Convention claims do not trump
state procedural bar rules, thus resolving one issue left unanswered in last
Term's Medellin case. 4 Yet, at the same time, the Court conspicuously shies
from the threshold question, "whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention5
grants rights that may be invoked by individuals in a judicial proceeding."
Instead, it simply assumes (without deciding) that
6 the rights in Article 36 of the
enforceable."
"judicially
are
Convention
Vienna
Some may view Sanchez-Llamas as a glass that is half empty, interpreting
the Court's tactics as a mere ploy, a strategic end-run that essentially enables
the Court to curtail the practical utility of such rights through shaving remedies.
I, on the other hand, choose to view the glass as half full. In this instance, the
Court's ringing silence leaves room for state courts, federal courts, and a host
of other sub-national and non-state actors to continue their Vienna-Conventionrelated efforts. Thus, Sanchez-Llamas leaves me cautiously optimistic about the
integrity and longevity of Vienna Convention rights.
II. LEAVING THE COURT HOUSE DOORS OPEN
One practical effect of the Court's decision (or lack thereof) is that the
"court house doors," for the time being, remain open (admittedly not wide
open, but open nonetheless). Consider what could have happened had the Court
decided that Article 36 was not judicially enforceable, but rather a mere
diplomatic pact between states. In such a scenario, courts-judges, litigators,
and, for the most part, individual defendants-would have been out of the
Vienna Convention business all together. While I suggest in Part III that this
eventuality would not have spelled doomsday for Vienna Convention

University of Tulsa College of Law (June 30, 2006) (on file with author).
2 Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides that detaining
officials must inform a foreign national "without delay" of his right to request that his
consulate be informed of the detention. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and
Optional Protocol on Disputes art. 36(l)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
In turn, foreign consulates must be free to communicate with, visit, and/or arrange legal
representation for foreign nationals. Id. art. 36(1)(a), (c). State parties to the Convention
must give "full effect" to the aforementioned rights. Id. art. 36(2).
3 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2674, 2680-82 (2006).
4 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per curiam). See generally Janet Koven
Levit, Medellin v. Dretke: Another Chapter in the Vienna Convention Narrative, 41 TULSA
L. REv. 193 (2005).
5 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2677.
6 Id. at 2674.
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protections largely due to the irrepressible transnational legal processes that
have already been unleashed, such a decision would certainly have
disenfranchised some transnational actors, shifted compliance incentives, and
inexorably altered the advocacy geography.
Instead, the Court, in avoiding the threshold question of judicial
enforceability, tacitly decides not to divest lower courts of a role in Vienna
Convention matters. Granted, the Court's decision, by squeezing lower courts'
remedial arsenal, limits the role that such courts may play. Yet, in the wake of
Sanchez-Llamas, courts importantly retain a role. First, "[a] defendant can raise
an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his
statements to police." 7 Furthermore, if a foreign national defendant "raises an
Article 36 violation at trial," then the "court can make appropriate
accommodations to ensure that the defendant secures, to the extent possible, the
benefits of consular assistance." 8 A foreign national may be able to wrap the
Vienna Convention transgression into a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim, particularly if trial counsel failed to inform a client
of his rights under Article 36, and such claims may not be susceptible to
procedural default rules. 9 Albeit a formidable threshold, if a defendant has
7 Id. at 2682. See generally William G. Phelps, Annotation, Duty of Court, in Federal
Criminal Prosecution, to Conduct Inquiry into Voluntariness of Accused's Statement, 132
A.L.R. FED. 415 (1986).
8 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682.
9 The availability of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to vindicate Vienna
Convention rights was a source of dialogue among the Justices. Id. at 2686; id. at 2690 n. 3
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Of particular
note is Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). This case involved a Mexican
national who was convicted of murder in 1989 and sentenced to death without any state
official, or his attorney, informing him of his Article 36 rights. The Mexican consulate
became involved, after Oklahoma set Mr. Valdez's execution date, only upon learning of the
execution from Valdez's family. Id. at 705. During the course of Valdez's post-conviction
appeals, the I.C.J. decided the LaGrandCase (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). On
the basis of the LaGrand Case, Valdez filed a subsequent post-conviction petition for relief,
arguing that the Oklahoma courts should waive the applicable procedural bar rules because
of an intervening change in the law. Valdez, 46 P.3d at 708. While the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that the legal basis for Valdez's Article 36 claim was "not new"
and "was available at the time of' Valdez's first petition and thus does not satisfy
Oklahoma's statutory standards for subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, id. at 709,
the court nonetheless granted petitioner's petition and remanded for resentencing on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 710-11. The Oklahoma court found that
counsel was "inexperienced in capital cases," and "did not have the financial resources
available to properly investigate Petitioner's childhood, social history, or other aspects of his
life." Id. at 710. The Oklahoma court further found that the Mexican consulate's
involvement was pivotal in discovering significant and important evidence, including
evidence of "severe organic brain damage" that "greatly contributed to and altered his
behavior," id. at 706, 710, and that this evidence might have changed the sentencer's
"balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances" against the death sentence. Id. at 710
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)). While the decision is
technically based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the ineffectiveness of
Valdez's counsel is inextricably linked to the Vienna Convention issues:
Although this Court has addressed claims relating to trial counsel's effectiveness in his
prior appeals, in those appeals, this Court was not presented with a claim that trial court
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defaulted Article 36 claims, such a defendant can overcome state procedural
bar rules by demonstrating "cause" and "prejudice."' 0 Some will undoubtedly
retort that the aforementioned remedial options are vacuously narrow, with
little functional utility. While this claim may be true, it is beyond the scope of
this Essay to assess the breadth or depth of the judiciary's ongoing role in
mediating Vienna Convention disputes. My modest claim is that the analytic
cadence of the Court's decision preserves some role for courts.
A.

State Courts

While Article 36 of the Vienna Convention may attach in some
administrative settings, most Vienna Convention questions will arise in the
1
law, 12
criminal context. 1 Despite a "federalization" of some areas of criminal
state courts will remain a significant judicial "port of entry" for Article 36
claims. 13 Thus, unless the Court answers the "unanswered question" of judicial
enforceability of Vienna Convention rights in the negative, state courts will
remain the initial touch point for many Vienna Convention issues.
Yet, until recently, 14 international legal scholars and practitioners have
failed to discover evidence relating to Petitioner's social, mental, and health history
[history that the Mexican Consulate was able to discover]. This Court was not presented
with a claim that trial counsel did not inform Petitioner he could have obtained
financial, legal and investigative assistance from his consulate ... In hindsight, and so
many years following Petitioner's conviction and direct appeal, it is difficult to assess
the effect consular assistance, a thorough background investigation and adequate legal
representation would have had. However, this Court cannot have confidence in the
jury's sentencing determination and affirm its assessment of a death sentence where the
jury was not presented with very significant and important evidence bearing upon
Petitioner's mental status and psyche at the time of the crime.
Id. at 710.
1o Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2682 (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,
504 (2003)).
11 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
supra note 2, art. 36 (when "the competent authorities of the receiving State" arrest, commit
"to prison or to custody pending trial," or otherwise detain a foreign national from a
"sending State," such authorities shall "without delay" inform such foreign national of his
right to contact the consulate).
12 See generally TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR
Ass'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998).
13 I borrow this useful term from Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American
Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism'sMultiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J.
1564 (2006), available at http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/pdf/115-7/Resnik.pdf.
14 For example, the International Law Association's International Law Weekend
recently hosted a panel titled, "State Courts and Transnational Decision-Making: The Road
Ahead." See Int'l Law Ass'n, International Law Weekend 2006: The Evolving World of
International Law 26 (Oct. 28, 2006), available at http://www.omm.com/webcode/
webdata/content/newsevents/ilw.pdf (program describing the event). Also, see generally
Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with
InternationalLaw, 82 N.C. L. REv. 457 (2004); Thomas R. Phillips, State Supreme Courts:
Local Courts in a Global World, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 557 (2003); Shirley S. Abrahamson &
Michael J. Fischer, All the World's a Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 (1997).
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largely overlooked the role of state courts in the making and implementing of
international law. That international legal scholars have neglected state courts
is likely just a specific manifestation of a much broader reality-in elite legal
circles, state courts are generally treated as an afterthought. Furthermore, the
role of state courts as transnational actors is regrettably caught in the cross5
wind of several contentious debates within the international legal academy.'
One real consequence of the academy's failure to recognize state courts as
transnational actors is that state courts, state judges, and state bars remain illequipped to grapple with questions of international law, especially questions as
complicated as those posed by the Vienna Convention. Thus, it is incumbent
upon those who consider themselves part of any semblance of an "international
legal community"--those who care about the enforcement and furtherance of
international law and legal commitments-to recognize that in practice state
courts are significant transnational actors and to educate state judges and state
bars on the fundamentals of international law.
Supreme Court Justices have gained much appreciation for transnational
law through their participation in international conferences and informal
meetings with their foreign counterparts.' 6 Federal judges and foreign judges

15 In particular, I refer to those debates regarding the domestic legal status of customary
international law (CIL), federal pre-eminence in foreign affairs and international law, and
substantive limitations on the Article II Treaty power. Those who view international law as a
process engaging a multitude of transnational actors (state courts presumably included
among them) also tend to defend a view of the U.S. Constitution whereby the federal
government and federal courts remain importantly dominant in questions of international law
and diplomacy, concomitantly emphasizing federal courts and federal law in scholarship and
advocacy. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State
Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1849 (1998) ("One need not denigrate the ability or
impartiality of state court judges to recognize that the federal judges have structural
attributes that make them more appropriate adjudicators to rule on international matters that
may embroil the nation in foreign policy disputes.") State courts thereby recede in the
analysis, often out of benign neglect.
On the other hand, one might expect that those who have argued that customary
international law is not part of any federal common law, see generally Curtis A. Bradley,
The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998); Curtis A.
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, PartII, 99 MICH. L. REv. 98 (2000),
or those who have argued in favor of substantive limitations on the executive branch's ability
to bind the states through treaties, see generally Bradley, supra, would champion the role of
states, state courts in particular, in furthering international law. Yet these same scholars tend
to reject a win-win, process-oriented view of international law in favor of a zero-sum view,
whereby fiercely "competing sovereign"--states, the federal government, foreign states, and
international bodies-vie for "the right to control America's judicial destiny." Harold
Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 56 (2004). These
scholars see states and state courts not as transnational actors but rather as transnational
detractors. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 14.
16 Many Justices have been traveling abroad with increasing frequency; on these trips,
Justices typically meet with prominent foreign jurists who illuminate foreign approaches to
the same legal issues that the Court confronts today. For example, in July 2003, Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer met with European justices to discuss
the now-abandoned European Constitution. See Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Opening Up to
World Opinion, LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2003, at 1; Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Citing More
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must recognize state court judges as co-participants in the making and shaping
of international legal norms and should open their cross-border judicial
conversations-both formal (opinion-writing and cross-citing of foreign and
international law) and informal (hobnobbing at conferences and foreign study
abroad programs)-to include their state counterparts. 17 In addition, efforts
such as the American Society of International Law's International Law: A
Handbook for Judges are commendable, although in focusing on "problems
and issues that federal judges may confront," 18 the 9Handbook inevitably misses
a host of issues that may arise before state judges.'
The legal brief is a critical vehicle to educate state judges on issues of
transnational law. While Supreme Court advocacy has "sizzle" in its prestige,
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") and international law advocacy
clinics should turn some energy from filing Supreme Court amicus briefs to
filing amicus briefs before the state courts that will often be the first, or
primary, judicial touch point with cutting edge issues of international law. For

Foreign Cases, USA TODAY, July 8, 2003, at A9. Likewise, in the summer of 2003, Justices
Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Breyer discussed the death penalty and terrorism with President
Chirac. See O'Connor Praises International Law, WORLDNETDAILY, Oct. 27, 2004,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=41143.
See also Linda
Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words From the Rehnquist Court,N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 4, at 3
(noting that, in addition to the meeting with the European justices, Justice Kennedy met with
Chinese justices, and Justice O'Connor has been active in the ABA's reform project for
Eastern Europe). Through these discussions the Justices come to see foreign law less and
less as a distant, disembodied pronouncement from the "black box" of a foreign institution,
but rather as the legal fruits, sometimes quite innovative, of their intelligent and charming
foreign colleagues and friends. See Charles Lane, Thinking Outside the U.S., WASH. POST,
Aug. 4, 2003, at A13 (noting that two legal scholars, one critical of the Court's use of
international law and one quite supportive, agree that "the justices' interest in international
law has probably been influenced by meetings with fellow jurists on their frequent visits
abroad"); see also Mauro, supra, at 8 ("On their trips overseas, the justices learn much that
helps explain their new internationalism, according to [Professor] Koh and others. For one
thing, they find out that foreign courts and their judges are mature, sophisticated counterparts
grappling with many of the same issues the justices face back at home.").
The U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on International Judicial Relations has been
particularly instrumental in facilitating this type of trans-judicial dialogue, spearheading
efforts "[t]o coordinate the federal judiciary's relationship with foreign judiciaries and with
official and unofficial agencies and organizations interested in international judicial
relations, and the establishment and expansion of the rule of law and the administration of
justice .....
" U.S. Courts, Jurisdiction of Committees of the Judicial Conference of the
United States (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf_.jurisdictions.htm#top.
17In this regard, I commend the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on International
Judicial Relations for including a state supreme court justice as a member.
18 DAVID J. BEDERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES
1

(2003).
19Likewise, the American Society of International Law's (ASIL) Judicial Advisory
Board, ASIL's judicial outreach arm that is responsible for the publication of International
Law: A Handbook for Judges, supra note 18, is comprised of federal judges from each
circuit, as well as "leading judiciary experts," and it does not appear from the limited public
information available that any state court judge is among the Board's membership. Press
Release, Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Justice Ginsburg New Chair of ASIL Judicial Advisory
Board (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/pr061OO4-OOO.pdf.
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instance, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relied heavily on an amicus
20
brief in a recent Vienna Convention case, as evidenced by the opinion itself
echoing of many of the cases and arguments appearing in that brief.2' The law
clerk involved in this case at once commended the amici on their invaluable

assistance in sorting through the international law issues and lamented that
amicus briefs were a stark aberration from standard practice. 22 This anecdotal
experience may reflect the reality that state courts have generally 2not been as
welcoming to amicus participation as their federal counterparts; 3 and often
state practice rules create obstacles that are particularly burdensome
to those
24

who wish to file amicus briefs regarding international law issues.
At even a more basic level, it is incumbent upon those training brief

writers, namely legal educators, to begin approaching transnational law as
integral, rather than peripheral, to the law school curriculum. Fortunately, some

significant efforts are being made in this regard. In her public speaking on
transnational law, Justice O'Connor repeatedly calls upon law schools to instill
in students a duty "to respect not only domestic law, but also the law of
nations. ,,25 The University of Michigan Law School requires all students who

20 See Brief of International Law Experts & Former Diplomats as Amici Curiae in

Support of Petitioner, Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-2004-442 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 30,
2004), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/TorresAmicabrief.pdf. International law experts
filed a similar amicus brief on behalf of Medellin. Brief of Former United States Diplomats
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 045928) (on file with author).
21 See Torres v. State, No. PCD-2004-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (Chapel,
J., concurring) (copy on file with author). This dynamic-an amicus brief argument finding
its way into judicial opinions-was mentioned in Sean Murphy's ContemporaryPracticeof
the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 579, 584 n.13 (Sean D.
Murphy ed.) (2004).
22 Interview with Lou Kohlman, Law Clerk, Chambers of the Honorable Charles
Chapel, Okla. Court of Criminal Appeals, in Tulsa, Okla. (Oct. 21, 2004) (notes on file with
author).
23 Sarah F. Corbally et al., Filing of Amicus Curiae Briefs in State Courts of Last
Resort: 1960-2000, 25 JUST. Sys. J. 39, 43 (2004) ("Historically, state courts were more
likely than the U.S. Supreme Court to limit the role of amicus participation in appeals.").
24 While a comprehensive review of state rules regarding the filing of amicus briefs is
beyond the scope of this Essay, a brief perusal of some such rules lead to these initial
observations. In some states, the prospective amici must ask the court, by application,
motion, brief or otherwise, for permission to file an amicus brief. See, e.g., LA. UNIF. R. CT.
APP. 2-12.11; MASS. R. APP. P. 17; Miss. R. APP. P. 29; Wyo. R. APP. P. 7.12(a); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, ch. 18, § III, App., Rule 3.4(F)(4). This is different from U.S. Supreme Court
practice, for example, which allows prospective amici to file a brief if all parties consent or if
the Court grants permission. SuP. CT. R. 37(3).
25 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address at the Southern Center for
International
Studies
3
(Oct.
28,
2003)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor-transcript.pdf). O'Connor adds:
Law schools must ensure that their students are well-versed in the increasingly
international aspects of legal practice. Some schools have already taken up the
challenge: For example, NYU Law School has brought foreign law professors to the
United States to share their expertise and perspectives; Yale has established a seminar
for members of constitutional courts from around the world; and the Michigan Law
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have entered after the fall of 2001 take a two-credit course in transnational
law,2 6 Georgetown University Law School enrolls all first year students in
"Law in a Global Context," 2 and Harvard Law School just modified its firstyear curriculum to require all first year students to take either Public
International Law, International Economic Law, or Comparative Law. 28 Many
law school textbooks in core classes (contracts, torts, property, constitutional
law, etc.) now include notes and material on relevant international and foreign
law, 29 and some text book companies are developing supplements for case
books that would offer professors an easy-to-adopt transnational law module
for their courses. The American Association of Law Schools, the umbrella
organization for law schools and faculty, sponsored a workshop at its 2006
Annual Meeting, entitled "Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the
First Year Curriculum" 31 and has launched a sister organization-the
International
AssociationSchool
of Law
In aworkshops
similar vein,
Universitythe
of
the Pacific McGeorge
of Schools.
Law hosted
on the
"Globalizing

School requires all students to complete a two-credit course in transnational law.
Id.; see also Phillip Kurata, Justice O'Connor Says U.S. Will Help Train Judges in Arab
Countries, USINFO (U.S. Dep't of State), Sept. 17, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/
Archive/2004/Feb/02-995699.html ("[S]everal American law schools, such as Yale
University, New York University, and the University of Michigan, will provide training in
commercial arbitration, and transnational judgments for both new and experienced judges.").
Given Justice O'Connor's commitment to transnational legal education, it is not surprising
that she dedicated Georgetown's new Eric E. Hotung International Law Center Building.
Press Release, Georgetown Univ. Law Sch., Georgetown Law Dedicates Hotung
International Building (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/
october.27.2004.html.
26 University of Michigan Law School Course List, http://cgi2.www.law.umich.edu/
_ClassSchedule/CourseList.asp#FirstYearRequired.
27 Georgetown Law, Introduction to the JD Program, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
curriculum/jdprog.cfm#First.
28 Press Release, Harvard Law Sch., HLS Faculty Unanimously Approves First-Year
Curricular
Reform
(Oct.
6,
2006),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2006/10/
06_curriculum.php.
29 See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 11 (4th ed. 1999) (noting that the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods is a significant source of contract law); THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 1 (2004) (discussing American civil procedure in comparative
perspective); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005) (including

note material throughout on foreign law).
30 See University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, Globalizing the Curriculum
Initiative, http://www.mcgeorge.edu/intemational/global/globalizing/ (referencing a "Global
Issues series" of books published by Thomson-West). Aspen Publishers are apparently
considering a similar project. See E-mail from Hiram Chodosh, Dean, Univ. of Utah S.J.
Quinney Coll. of Law, to Janet Levit, Professor, Univ. of Tulsa Coll. of Law (Sept. 26, 2006)
(on file with author).
3 Association of American Law Schools, Workshop on Integrating Transnational
Legal Perspectives into the First Year Curriculum (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.aals.org/
am2006/program/transnational/index.html.
32 International Association of Law Schools, http://www.ialsnet.org.
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These steps are all positive, and, hopefully, will generate

transformative momentum.
Finally, educating state court judges requires that international legal
scholars and practitioners appreciate that most state judges do not have life
tenure and must stand for periodic re-election. Thus, even if a state judge
understands how international law may impact a particular case, that judge may
be unwilling to grant international law deference if perceived as unpopular or
politically problematic. This dynamic is a real problem in "red states," or
America's heartland, where fears and misperceptions of international law run
deep. 34 Thus, educating judges and lawyers, alone, may not be enoughinternational scholars and educators must better educate the constituents that
will elect and retain judges. Here, I believe that we, as a discipline, have been
rather near sighted. International law, for the most part, is a coastal enterprisemany of the great scholars, think tanks, and international law practices reside
on the coasts, and logically so. Yet, for the most part, the international legal
community does not reach out to middle America, and in such neglect, we have
allowed talk-radio hosts to co-opt rhetoric and mold attitudes. 35 Thus, we must
reconceive of legal advocacy as more than brief-writing and appellate
arguments-it must also encompass broader efforts to educate the public
through the media and through demonstrating how international law, if not
obeyed, will have real consequences at home, in places like Oklahoma and

3 University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, supra note 30.
34 See Editorial, Under Review Merits, Not Politics, Should Decide Case, OKLAHOMAN,
May 13, 2004, at 14A ("Those [state or federal appeals courts] are the courts the state must
answer to in this case. Not the world court, which was criticized by two law professors...
[as the] 'International Court of Hubris."'); Kim Cobb, Parole Board Votes to Spare Life of
Mexican, Hous. CHRON., May 8, 2004, at A3 (in response to the ICJ's decision in Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals, Robert Black, spokesman for Gov. Rick Perry, said "the governor
respects the world court's right to have an opinion, but the fact remains they have no
standing and no jurisdiction in the state of Texas."). In fact, in Torres v. Oklahoma,
Governor Henry's decision to commute Torres' sentence to life in prison without parole was
based on the Avena decision. Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, State of
Oklahoma, Governor Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004),
available
at
http://www.governor.state.ok.us/display-article.php?article-id=301 &
article_type = 1. The clemency decision resurfaced in the fall 2006 gubernatorial campaign. In
a last ditch effort to close a growing gap in the polls, Representative Ernest Istook, the
Republican gubernatorial challenger, placed Governor Henry on the defensive by dragging
out the Torres case as a sad instance of Oklahoma bowing "to pressure from the Mexican
government," as well as pressure from "liberal and international groups that oppose the death
penalty." See Barbara Hoberock, Istook: Henry's Soft on Crime, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 2,
2006, at A14; Michael McNutt, Henry, Istook Face-off in Debate, OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 24,
2006, available at http://newsok.com/article/2960723; Barbara Hoberock, Gubernatorial
Debate: Health Care, Education, Public Safety: Henry, Istook Swap Barbs, TULSA WORLD,
Oct. 24, 2006, at AI3.
35 A speech by Deputy Secretary-General Mark M. Brown underscored this point,
noting that "much of the public discourse that reaches the US heartland has been largely
abandoned to its loudest detractors such as Rush Limbaugh and Fox News." Mark Malloch
Brown, Deputy Sec'y-Gen., United Nations, Address on Power and Super-Power: Global
Leadership in the Twenty-First Century (June 6, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.un.orgINews/Press/docs/2006/dsgsm287.doc.htm).
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Texas, and not merely in Guantanamo or Iraq.
B.

Civil Suits

In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court eliminated certain criminal remedies as an
answer to Vienna Convention transgressions. Sanchez-Llamas raised his claim
on direct criminal appeal, requesting that the court suppress incriminating
statements, presumably as a means to shield his conviction or concomitantly
reduce the length of the sentence. 36 Bustillo's claim involved a state court writ
of habeas corpus in which he raised his Vienna Convention claims for the first
time, thereby seeking habeas relief in spite of state procedural bar rules. 37 Yet,
Sanchez-Llamas does not address, and thereby does not curtail, civil remedies.
Indeed, lower courts have occasionally considered civil damages as 38a
means to redress Vienna Convention transgressions. Consider Jogi v. Voges,
in which the Seventh Circuit held that federal courts have jurisdiction over
Article 36 claims under the treaty prong of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).39 Mr.
Jogi, a national of India, was charged for aggravated battery with a firearm in
Champaign, Illinois, on October 6, 1995. Although the detaining officials
knew that Jogi was an Indian national, "[a]t no time was Jogi ever informed of
his right to contact the Indian consulate.",4 1 Jogi pled guilty and served six years
of a twelve year sentence, at which point he was released from his sentence,
"removed from the United States and returned to India.' 42 While in prison, Jogi
learned of the Vienna Convention and filed a pro se complaint against various
law enforcement officials, "seeking compensatory, nominal, and punitive
damages" for violation of his "International Rights" under the Vienna
Convention; the ATS was the jurisdictional anchor.4 3
Although the district court dismissed Jogi's claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, 4 the Seventh Circuit reversed.4 5 The court initially notes
that the ATS bestows jurisdiction on the federal courts for aliens' claims for
torts committed in violation of "the law of nations" or "a treaty of the United
States. ' 46 While the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
created a formidable threshold for ATS claims raised pursuant to the "law of
nations" or "customary international law, '47 Jogi's claim, rooted instead in a
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2676 (2006).
Id. at 2676-77.
38 Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.").
40 Jogi, 425 F.3d at 370.
36

17

41

Id.

Id.
Id. at 370-71.
44 Jogi v. Piland, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1026-27 (C.D. Ill. 2001).
41 Jogi, 425 F.3d at 367.
46 Id. at 372.
47 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004) (creating a high threshold to
42
41
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treaty, is not covered by the standard that Sosa creates. 48 The Seventh Circuit
continues its analysis by asking whether Article 36 creates a private right of
action for damages. The court first states that the Vienna Convention is a selfexecuting treaty. and, concomitantly, Jogi's claim is not dependent on
additional, implementing legislation at the national level.4 9 The court then
answers the question that the Supreme Court avoided in Sanchez-Llamas,
concluding that Article 36 does not merely create obligations between state
parties but also creates individual, judicially enforceable rights. 50 Furthermore,
because the Vienna Convention itself demands that "full effect be given" to the
rights set forth in Article 36,51 and because no alternative remedies are
52
available given the rather unique confluence of circumstances in Jogi's case,
the court holds that Article 36 creates an implied (or private) right of action for
civil damages. 3 While the Seventh Circuit certainly recognizes that Jogi's
claim for damages in this particular case is "extravagant," the court nonetheless
"even nominal
concludes that this "is of no legal significance" because
54
damages are appropriate for the vindication of a right."
Admittedly, commentators have sharply criticized the Seventh Circuit's
approach, particularly its establishing a private right of action for Article 36
breaches.5 The critique centers, in great part, on the question which the Court
left unanswered in Sanchez-Llamas-whether the Vienna Convention creates
judicially enforceable rights (and the attendant question of whether it creates a
private cause of action). Like the Court, I choose not to resolve this question in

segregate any violation of the "law of nations" or customary international law from a small
class that, as part of federal common law, would create a private right of action for
damages).
48 Jogi, 425 F.3d at 373.

41 Id.at 378.
50 Id.at 382 (after conceding that there is some ambiguity in the text of the Vienna
Convention, particularly in juxtaposing the language in Article 3.6 regarding "rights" and
individual "requests" with the general language in the Preamble which notes that the purpose
of the Vienna Convention is not to "benefit individuals" but rather to "ensure the efficient
performance of functions by consular posts," the court "conclude[s] that even though many
if not most parts of the Vienna Convention address only state-to-state matters, Article 36
confers individual rights on detained nationals.").
51 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2, art. 36.
52 The court concludes that there are no available "administrative remedies," especially
because this case arises after Mr. Jogi was released from prison and returned to India.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit had already decided that the U.S.'s Vienna Convention
obligations do not require suppression of statements made without a foreign national having
been granted Vienna Convention rights. United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616
(7th Cir. 2000).
" Jogi, 425 F.3d at 385 ("In the absence of any administrative remedy or other
alternative to measures we have already rejected (such as suppression of evidence), a
damages action is the only avenue left. .

.

. We conclude, therefore, . . . that there is an

implied private right of action to enforce the individual's Article 36 rights.").
54 Id. at 385 (citing Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1999)).
55 See generally Case Comment, Jogi v. Voges, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2644 (2006);
Anthony Jones, Jogi v. Voges: Has the Seventh Circuit Opened the Floodgates to Vienna
Convention Litigation in US.Courts?, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 425 (2006).
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this brief Essay. My purpose in highlighting the Jogi case is to celebrate the
ingenuity and creativity of our profession, as well as the steadfast tenacity of
certain international norms. As the Court squeezes remedial options under the
Vienna Convention, lower courts and litigants will innovate and find remedial
alternatives. This legal dynamism and elasticity is only viable as long as the
Court maintains a role for the judiciary in Vienna Convention claims.
III. ON-THE-GROUND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROGRESS
In limiting remedial options, the Court answers some of the vexing and
recurring Vienna Convention questions that have emerged and remerged on the
Court's docket, 56 particularly in the wake of the International Court of Justice's
decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals. 57 At a base level, however, in
avoiding the threshold question of judicial enforceability, the Court
fundamentally maintains the status quo-a status quo that, as this Essay
discusses below, has offered fertile opportunity for a multitude of transnational
actors to entrench Vienna Convention protections. First, the Court's analysis
essentially echoes the cadence of most recent federal court decisions that have
addressed similar Vienna Convention claims: (1) assume that the Vienna
Convention creates judicially enforceable rights; and (2) reject remedies
that
58
involve suppression, dismissal, and/or "lowering" of procedural bars.
See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per curiam) (dismissing for
improvidently granting the writ of certiorari; originally accepting cert. to determine whether
U.S. courts must reconsider Medellin's Vienna Convention claims in light of the ICJ's
Avena decision); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (while the Vienna Convention
"arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest," the
ICJ's provision order requesting a stay would not trump either state or federal procedural
default rules); Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 919 (2003) (mem.) (Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari); Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562 (2003) (mem.)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
57 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
58 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2674 (2006). Many federal circuit courts
have approached Vienna Convention questions in a similar manner, avoiding the question of
whether the Vienna Convention creates judicially enforceable rights and instead resolving
the question whether such violations require suppression, "lowering" of procedural bars, or
dismissing the indictment. See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc)
("We hold that irrespective of whether or not the treaties create individual rights to consular
notification, the appropriate remedies do not include suppression of evidence or dismissal of
the indictment."); United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Even if
we assume arguendo that De La Pava had judicially enforceable rights under the Vienna
Convention-a position we do not adopt-the Government's failure to comply with the
consular notification provision is not grounds for dismissal of the indictment."); Murphy v.
Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that "even if the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations could be said to create individual rights" the defendant could not
obtain habeas relief because his claim was procedurally defaulted); United States v. Page,
232 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that "although some judicial remedies may
exist, there is no right in a criminal prosecution to have evidence excluded or an indictment
dismissed due to a violation of Article 36"); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d
616, 621 (7th Cir. 2000) ("It is sufficient for present purposes to assume that such an
individual right is created by the Convention and to confront squarely whether the
56
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Additionally, Sanchez-Llamas undoubtedly offered the Court a ripe
opportunity to transform the Vienna Convention landscape by divesting courts
of Vienna Convention claims and concomitantly leaving aggrieved foreign
nationals with no remedial outlet other than the whims of geopolitical
diplomacy (which, in most cases, would be tantamount to no remedy all
together).59 If the Court had pursued this route, it may have diminished extant
incentives to promote and institutionalize law enforcement practices that
comport with the consular notification provision of Article 36. Instead,
however, the Court maintains the underlying relationship between courts,
foreign nationals, and Vienna Convention rights. Thus, the Court preserves the
on-the-ground, day-to-day relevance of Vienna Convention practice and,
therefore, does not choke the Vienna Convention-related transnational legal
processes that have already been unleashed.
Sanchez-Llamas must be understood as part of a dynamic, iterative process
of international lawmaking. This "international law as process" approach has
deep theoretical roots, beginning with Lasswell and McDougal's New Haven
School of International Law, and evolving into Dean Harold Koh's more
contemporary Transnational Legal Process School. 6 1 The international law of
consular notification rights thus presents an evolving story, with the drafting
and ratification of the Vienna Convention merely the first chapter, followed by
a series of ICJ cases which not only interpret Article 36 rights and obligations
exclusionary rule is the appropriate sanction for a violation of that right."); United States v.
Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873,
886 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Even if we assume for present purposes that the Convention creates an
individually enforceable right, it would not follow, on this record, that the statements should
be excluded merely because the Convention has been violated."); United States v. LomberaCamorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (declining to decide whether
Article 36 creates an individually enforceable right but concluding that suppression of
evidence is an inappropriate remedy); United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 98687 (10th Cir. 2001) (declining to decide whether the Vienna Convention creates individually
enforceable rights, but concluding that suppression is not an appropriate remedy); United
States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1282 (11 th Cir. 2002) (holding that a violation of the
Vienna Convention does not warrant dismissal of an indictment); United States v. CordobaMosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (1 lth Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (same).
59 Respondents, Oregon and the Virginia Department of Corrections, as well as the
United States as amicus curiae, argued that Article 36 does not create judicially enforceable
rights and therefore the only remedy for transgressions is a "political and diplomatic" one.
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2677 (citing Brief for the United States).
60 MYRES S.
McDOUGAL,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
POWER, AND
POLICY: A
CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTION 8 (1953); Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive

Process ofAuthoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967); Myres S. McDougal & W.
Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How
International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1980); W. Michael

Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 101, 107 (1981).

61 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183
(1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2626 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).

(1995));
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but also publicize the disjuncture between treaty obligations and on-the-ground
practice, and now unfolding in a series of domestic cases which grapple with
the complexities of honoring Vienna Convention rights in a diffuse federal
system. This process unleashed irrepressible forces, triggering transnational
dialogue and energizing multiple transnational actors in state and local
government, as well as in the private sector, in ways that transcend the outcome
of any particular case. The results of this transnational legal process have been
at once tangible, in the form of rules, regulations and protocols designed to
embody Vienna Convention rights, and intangible, shaping and molding state
actors' legal consciousness. The following is a brief perusal of some of these
initiatives, with a focus on non-judicial actors and institutions.
At the national level, the U.S. Department of State, with a diplomatic
corps spread throughout the globe, understands that its employeesdiplomats-are a primary beneficiary of Vienna Convention rights. Thus, the
State Department's institutional interests are linked to the integrity of Vienna
Convention rights. The State Department's Consular Notification and Outreach
Division deploys staff to interface with law enforcement officials throughout
the country, delineating in easy-to-understand terms what the Vienna
Convention requires of detaining officials. 64 This Outreach Division also
disseminates (virtually and in hard copy): flow charts that essentially map the
Vienna Convention requirements; model procedures and protocols that local
law enforcement agencies can adopt; a Consular Notification and Access
Reference Card that provides a Miranda-esque script that law enforcement
officials can use upon detaining a foreign national; translation of a consular
notification script into thirteen languages; phone numbers and addresses for
consulates throughout the U.S.; and training videos. 65 Some of these State
62

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9);

LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12. See also
Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of InternationalLaw in the Heartland. Torres and the Role of
State Courts in TransnationalLegal Conversation, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 163, 16674 (2004); Levit, supra note 4, at 194-97.
63 See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per curiam); Torres v. Okla., No.
PCD-2004-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (Chapel, J., concurring) (copy on file with
author).
64 James Lawrence, a Public Affairs Specialist, is charged with traveling the United
States to train and educate more than 700,000 local law enforcement officials in 19,000
jurisdictions on consular notification matters. Interview with James A. Lawrence, Pub.
Affairs Specialist, Consular Notification & Outreach Div., U.S. Dep't of State, in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 2006)
65 See Consular Notification & Outreach Div., U.S. Dep't of State, State Department
Consular Notification & Access Activities from January 1998 to January 2006 (2006) (copy
on file with author); U.S. Dep't of State, Consular Notification & Access (Sept. 2005) (CDROM) (copy on file with author); Consular Notification & Outreach Div., U.S. Dep't of
State, Consular Notification & Access Reference Card: Instructions for Arrest and
Detentions of Foreign Nationals (2004) (copy on file with author); U.S. Dep't of State,
Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for Federal, State, and Local Law
Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the
Rights of Consular Officials To Assist Them, http://travel.state.gov/consul-notify.html; U.S.
Dep't of State, Arresting a Non-U.S. Citizen: Consular Notification Process, available at
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Department documents have been 66incorporated essentially verbatim in state and
local laws, policies and programs.
Sub-national governments, states and municipalities, are emerging as
prominent transnational actors, as evidenced by their role in embedding
Vienna Convention rights. For instance, California incorporated Article 36 into
its penal code, essentially requiring "every peace officer, upon arrest and
booking.., for more than two hours of a known or suspected foreign national"
to "advise the foreign national that he or she has a right to communicate with
an official from the consulate of his or her country." 68 While no other state
legislature has yet followed California's lead, state administrative agencies and
offices of attorneys general are taking significant steps to heighten law
enforcement community awareness of their Vienna Convention obligations.6 9
Likewise, local police department operating procedures incorporate Vienna
Convention obligations, often creating roadmaps and consular notification
forms that functionally translate treaty
requirements, stated in diplomatic
70
legalese, into on-the-ground practice.
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CNAFlowcolor.pdf.
66 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 834c(a)(2) (West 2006) ("The law enforcement
official who receives the notification request pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be guided by his
or her agency's procedures in conjunction with the Department of State Guidelines
Regarding Foreign Nationals Arrested or Detained in the United States."); Greg Abbott,
Attorney Gen. of Tex., Magistrate's Guide to Consular Notification Under the Vienna
Convention (2006), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AGPublications/pdfs/
vienna-guidebook.pdf.
67 See generally EARL

H.

FRY,

THE EXPANDING

ROLE OF

STATE

AND

LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1998) (focusing on the foreign policy interests and

activities of states, as opposed to states' relationship to international law and lawmaking, and
providing many statistics of the mounting economic impact of states in the foreign affairs
arena).
68 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 834c(a)(1). Interestingly, international tribunals that have
asked what Article 36 requires of detaining officials have concluded that notification should
be given somewhere within the first 24-72 hours. California's statute is much more stringent
at 2 hours.
69 See generally OR. DEP'T. OF CORR. POLICY 40.2.10 (2005)

(setting forth a

department-wide policy that "[d]uring the intake process, designated Intake staff will ask the
inmate if he/she is a U.S. citizen. If the inmate is identified as a foreign national" then the
foreign national should be granted the right to have an official "notify the consulate" of the
detention, "communicate with their consuls", and, in turn, permit consuls to "communicate
with and have access to the foreign national inmate."); Abbott, supra note 66; Mass.
Attorney Gen., Consular Notification Requirements: Arrest or Detention of Foreign
Nationals (Nov. 2003), available at www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/cjn5.pdf. The
Oklahoma Law Enforcement, Education, and Training Council, a quasi-public entity, offers
live and online continuing education to law enforcement officers; one training video is
dedicated to consular notification. See Oklahoma Council on Law Enforcement Education
and
Training
(CLEET),
Continuing
Education:
Consular
Notification,
http://www.cleet.state.ok.us/ContinuingEducation.htm.
70 See, e.g., LOUISVILLE, KY., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE LOUISVILLE

METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT, No. 10.4.5 (2005) ("Upon knowingly arresting a foreign

national, officers shall ...[i]mmediately advise the foreign national of his right to consular
notification."). See also Michael Ramage, Emerging Immigration Issues for Local Law
Enforcement: A Presentation to the International Association of Chiefs of Police Legal
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Non-state actors are also part of such Vienna Convention processes. The
American Bar Association's Guidelines for Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases deploy appointed counsel to protect Vienna Convention rights, calling
upon counsel to: (1) "make appropriate efforts" to determine whether the client
is indeed a foreign national; (2) "advise the client of his or her right to
communicate with the relevant consular office;" and (3) "obtain... consent" to
contact the consulate and, upon receiving such consent, "immediately contact
the client's consular office.'' 71 The Pegasus Research Foundation answered (in
part) Congress' post-9/11 call to enchance local law enforcement agencies'
ability to "talk to each other" by creating a local-to-local data communications
network. One peripheral effect of this local-to-local network is electronic
consular notification functionality, thereby offering local law enforcement
agencies who
73 subscribe the electronic capability to fulfill Vienna Convention
obligations.
While Vienna Convention litigation made its way through various
international, national, and state courts, non-judicial actors began
institutionalizing processes that, if obeyed in a meaningfully pervasive manner,
would cure Vienna Convention transgressions and obviate future litigation.
Perhaps fear-fear that Article 36 breaches may somehow undermine law
enforcement efforts in criminal cases-motivates such actors, particularly law
enforcement officials. And, in maintaining some role for courts, SanchezLlamas importantly preserves "fear" as an underlying motivating force
(although, in constricting some remedial options, the Court certainly reduces its
potency).
However, I suspect that fear is not the only, or even the principal, trigger
of such transnational legal process-the litigation, particularly high-profile
international litigation, widely publicized Vienna Convention violations,
heightening on-the-ground awareness of Vienna Convention obligations, as
well as the reciprocal benefits that U.S. nationals enjoy. Certainly, a negative
decision on the question of judicial enforceability may have shifted such
dynamics. Yet, international norms are resilient and malleable, evincing a type
of viscosity under top-down pressure. I am inexorably drawn to the image of
my children's playdough factory-place the playdough in the top of a tube,
push down on a type of stopper or plunger, and out the bottom, in all directions,
stream laces of colorful playdough. Otherwise put, when some legal doors
Officers Section (Sept. 25, 2005), available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/OGC/
Seminarjnfo %20et_%20al/ ("Make sure your troops know of the obligation to notify
foreign consul whenever ANY foreign national is detained or arrested. Have a policy in
place and assure your agency follows it.").
71 AM. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEFENSE
IN
DEATH
PENALTY
CASES,
GUIDELINE
10.6
(2003),
available at

COUNSEL

http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf.
72 Lee Colwell, Pegasus Research Found., 2005 Annual Report to Congress on the
Local-to-Local (L2L) Information Exchange Needs & Requirements of the Nation's Local
Law Enforcement Agencies (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.pegasusresearch.org/
2005_AnnualReporttoCongress.pdf.
"

Id. at 2.
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appear to be closing, international norms find alternative, more welcoming
outlets.74 Elsewhere I have discussed this phenomenon in the context of
international human rights and international environmental law, noting how
clusters of transnational actors adopt and institutionalize norms that national,
top-down decision makers reject or foreclose. 75 Likewise, in this instance,
transnational actors continue to innovate-from a civil suit for damages to an
electronic consular notification system-and find new answers to old problems.
Thus, even if Sanchez-Llamas had closed the court house doors all together,
certain transnational legal processes had already been unleashed, and, assuming
that such efforts had reached a critical mass, many of the goals of Vienna
Convention litigation would continue to be served.
IV. CONCLUSION
The pessimist will undoubtedly lament the Court's limiting the type of
relief available to foreign national defendants who, due to official mistake and
misstep, have not been informed of their right to contact their consulate. I
remain an optimist because Sanchez-Llamas does not upset the fundamental,
underlying dynamics that have generated broad-based Vienna Convention
activity. Likewise, one who views the glass as half empty might unduly fixate
on the Texas Court of Appeal's recent reliance on Sanchez-Llamas to deny a
writ of habeas corpus in Ex parte Medellin.76 Instead, this Essay focuses on a
glass that the Court left half full, 77 at once appreciating that the Texas Court of
Appeals' remains an open venue for Vienna Convention claims, welcoming
Judge Price's concurring admonition that law enforcement officials become
"well-versed in the language of Article 36" and "faithfully" apprise "foreign
nationals of their rights under the treaty, ' 78 and celebrating the Texas Attorney
General's on-the-ground efforts to anoint local magistrates (who usually
interface with detainees "without delay" 79) as backstop guarantors of Vienna

74 I owe this general insight to Judith Resnik. See Resnik, supra note 13.
75 Clusters of transnational actors have essentially adopted Kyoto-like climate change
regulation despite the Bush administration's decision not to send the Kyoto Climate Change
treaty to the Senate for ratification, most poignantly illustrated by California's adopting
Kyoto targets as state law. See Janet Koven Levit, International Law Happens: Executive
Power, American Exceptionalism, and Bottom-Up Lawmaking 13-15 (2006), available at
Likewise,
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7853&context-expresso.
clusters of private parties, NGOs, government bureaucrats, labor unions and trade
associations often negotiate codes of conduct, as well as industry-wide principles and
standards, reinvigorating the very international human rights norms that the executive branch
has essentially abandoned as dormant, such as the unratified or non-self-executing treaties.
Id. at 16-18.
76
- S.W.3d -, 2006 WL 3302639, at *7 (Tx. Crim App. 2006).
77 See also Posting of Janet Levit to Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/archives/
archive_2006 11_12-2006_11_18.shtml (Nov. 16, 2006, 3:05 EST).

78 Ex parte Medellin, __ S.W.3d -, 2006 WL 3302639, at *27-28 (Tx. Crim App.
2006) (Price, J., concurring).
79 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
supra note 2, art. 36(l)(b).
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Convention rights. 80 Displaced international law, like displaced water, does not
immediately evaporate-it first runs in multiple directions, often re-pooling in
places where evaporation is unlikely or impossible. To focus on "top-down"
Vienna Convention litigation, on the Court's affirmative decision in SanchezLlamas, without also contemplating all that is transpiring on the ground-level,
is to paint a woefully incomplete picture and, perhaps, to skew our scholarly
and advocacy endeavors.

80 See Abbott, supra note 66, at foreword ("This Magistrate's Guide is designed to help

ensure that foreign governments can extend appropriate consular services to their nationals
in the United States and that the United States complies with its legal obligations to such
governments. The instructions and guidance herein should be followed by all federal, state,
and local government judicial officials, insofar as they pertain to foreign nationals subject to
such officials' authority or to matters within such officials' competence.").

